



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 October, 1982

Yes
not
 Dear John,
Prime Minister
 Agree to send attached message to
Prime Minister of Fiji?
 A.J.C. $\frac{5}{10}$

The Falklands: Possible Discussion at Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting, Suva, 14-18 October 1982

When Mr Onslow discussed with Sonny Ramphal in August how best to secure continuing Commonwealth goodwill for our policy on the Falklands, Ramphal made three suggestions:

- (a) He volunteered to talk to the Permanent Representatives of Commonwealth countries in New York. (He duly did this on 16 September, and Sir J Thomson has reported that he spoke effectively and robustly).
- (b) He suggested that it might be useful for us to arrange for our position to be explained at the meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government from the Asia/Pacific region (CHOGRM) to be held in Suva from 14-18 October.
- (c) He suggested that it would be helpful if the Prime Minister were to send messages to a wide range of Heads of Commonwealth Governments, taking them as much as possible into her confidence, explaining British objectives, and also the constraints under which we had to operate.

The Commonwealth is continuing to prove a valuable asset in our campaign at the UN. Mr Ramphal's suggestions, furthermore, chime with our own ideas on lobbying other governments, particularly as regards obtaining support for our no-negotiations policy, in preparation for the Falklands debate at the General Assembly. So far, the following actions have been taken:

- (a) The Secretary of State has sent messages to his colleagues in the Ten and to the Americans about their attitude to any draft resolution calling for negotiations.
- (b) He has also sent messages to his counterparts in friendly countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) - many of them are of course members of the Commonwealth - seeking their help in obstructing an extreme, pro-Argentine section in the communique issuing after the NAM Foreign Ministers meeting in New York on 4-5 October.
- (c) He has sent messages to the Foreign Ministers of Thailand and the Philippines [the only ASEAN countries not in the NAM and thus not included under (b)]: to



facilitate the achievement of a coordinated ASEAN view favourable to the UK, prior to the UN debate.

- (d) Our Embassies/High Commissions have been lobbying friendly governments world-wide; and
- (e) there have also been lobbying exercises over particular aspects of the debate at the UNGA, eg regarding the Committee of 24 in August and the General Committee on 22 September.

CHOGRM is an important Commonwealth forum. Seventeen governments from the Asia/Pacific region are eligible to attend (including Australia, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Sri Lanka). So far as we know Mrs Gandhi is likely to be the only major Head of Government not attending in person. The meeting traditionally considers both regional and global issues, and the question of the Falklands is almost bound to come up. This being so, Mr Pym believes that we should do what we can to ensure that participants are exposed to an authoritative and sympathetic account of our position.

We have consulted our High Commissioners in the posts concerned, who are generally in favour of our trying to ensure that our views are reflected at the meeting. Our High Commissioner in Suva believes that the Prime Minister of Fiji, Ratu Mara, who will be Chairman of the meeting, is likely to be responsive. Mr Wade-Gery in New Delhi has commented that he sees 'advantage in the Indians being exposed at Suva to a full and well argued explanation of our position with appropriate emphasis on the rule of international law and the right of self-determination'.

Ramphal has suggested that the best way forward would be for the Prime Minister to write to Ratu Mara, asking him to raise the matter as appropriate with his colleagues at the meeting. Ramphal would then suggest to Ratu Mara that the Prime Minister's letter be considered during the weekend retreat.

Mr Pym believes that this is sensible advice. Since CHOGRM is by definition a meeting of Heads of Government, a message at Prime Ministerial level is inescapable. The exercise is unlikely to bring us substantial dividends; but it could just persuade one or two participants to take a more sympathetic view of our position at the UN General Assembly. We would also not wish Ramphal (who remains very helpful on this issue) to feel that we first asked his advice and then ignored it.

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I attach two draft telegrams for the Prime Minister's consideration, the first containing instructions to our High Commissioners and the second containing the text of a draft message from the Prime Minister to Ratu Mara.

/Mr Pym

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Mr Pym considers that we should wait a little longer before deciding whether to pursue Ramphal's separate suggestion that the Prime Minister should send messages to a wide range of Heads of Commonwealth governments. The best time might be towards the end of October; and I shall write separately about this later.

Yours ever
J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL .

Precedence/Deskby
PRIORITY

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO PRIORITY SUVA
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	RFI CANBERRA, WELLINGTON
	10	MIPT: FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO
	11	RATU MARA
	12	BEGINS:
	13	1. As I am sure you know, the goodwill and staunch support
	14	which you and other Commonwealth leaders have given ^{us} since
	15	the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands have been a
	16	source of inspiration and encouragement to me and to my
	17	colleagues, and have reminded us all of the importance of the
	18	principles which Commonwealth members hold in common.
	19	2. We shall continue to be very grateful for any support that
	20	you and your Commonwealth colleagues can give us in the months
///	21	ahead. In this connection, I would particularly like to
//	22	explain our thinking to you before you come to chair the
/	23	forthcoming meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government from
	24	the Asia/Pacific region. Britain is not, of course, represented
	25	at these meetings, but if the matter arises, I ^{sh} would like our

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword views
File number		Dept	Distribution Limited CCD FID UND SAD SPD SEAD PS PS/Mr Onslow PS/PUS Sir J Leahy Mr Squir
Drafted by (Block capitals) PRIVATE SECRETARY			
Telephone number 233 4641			
Authorised for despatch			
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		
			cc: No 10 Downing St

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

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1 views, and the strength with which we hold them, to be fully
2 understood. I should in any case be happy for you to pass
3 copies of this message to the other participants if you see
4 fit, so that they have access to an explanation of our position
5 at the meeting and when, later, they are considering their own
6 position at the United Nations.

7 3. You probably already know that Argentina is currently
8 seeking support for a draft General Assembly resolution calling
9 on us to enter into negotiations with her about the future of
10 the Islands. As I am sure you will understand, the UK will
11 oppose any such resolution. We cannot be expected to resume -
12 as if nothing had happened - the negotiations which Argentina
13 herself broke off with no warning earlier this year in order to
14 invade. *Our losses were considerable, despite our success.* The invasion was a traumatic experience for the
15 Islanders. ~~and for the British people as a whole. Our losses~~
16 ~~were considerable, despite our success. The peaceable population~~
17 ~~of the Falkland Islands~~ now have to live with the terrible
18 aftermath of the war, including unexploded mines, scattered
19 indiscriminately throughout the Islands. The damage will take
20 considerable time, effort and money to repair. Time will also
21 be needed to enable the people of the Falkland Islands to
22 recover and think about their future before expressing their
23 views. What is more, despite the Argentine Government's
24 various attempts to persuade the international community that
25 hostilities have ceased de facto, they have still failed to
26 issue an unambiguous declaration that hostilities will not be
27 resumed. Our efforts to end the conflict and start the process
28 of getting relations back to normal have met with little or no
29 understanding or co-operation. Argentina appears to see
30 negotiation solely as a route towards the transfer of
31 sovereignty.

32 4. If there is any discussion of this subject at your meeting
33 in Suva, I should be most grateful if you and other Commonwealth
34 countries would underline the fundamental principles of the

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)


Classification and Caveats
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1 <<<<
 2 UN Charter which Argentina called into question by her invasion,
 3 principles which have always received the Commonwealth's
 4 firm support. I hope in particular that you will all
 5 continue to press for the principle of self-determination to
 6 be given full weight in the case of the Falkland Islanders,
 7 who are as fully entitled to it as all other peoples and whose
 8 rights in this, as in many other respects, Argentina seeks to
 9 deny. I would also ask that you and the other governments to
 10 be represented at the meeting ^{sh}ould refrain - as many of them
 11 did in 1976 - from supporting any resolution at the UN General
 12 Assembly which calls on us to negotiate. Although the timing
 13 is not yet clear, I understand that the General Assembly may
 14 be discussing the Falklands some time in mid-November.

15 ENDS
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 17 PYM
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OUT TELEGRAM

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Precedence/Deskby

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TEL NO

1 ZCZC
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6 FM FCO 051330Z OCTOBER 82
7 TO PRIORITY SUVA
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9
10 AND TO PRIORITY CANBERRA, WELLINGTON
11 AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO ROUTINE NEW DELHI, PORT MORESBY,
12 DACCA, KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE
13 AND SAVING FOR INFORMATION TO NUKU'ALOFA, COLOMBO, UKMIS NEW YORK
14 POSSIBLE DISCUSSION OF FALKLANDS DURING CHOGRM
15 1. We are grateful for responses to FCO telno 131 to Suva.
16 2. In the light of all these comments, and of further advice
17 from Ramphal, the Prime Minister has decided to send a message
18 to Ratu Mara setting out our policy and encouraging him to pass
19 a copy to others present at the meeting so that they are aware of
20 our views. Ramphal has undertaken to suggest to Ratu Mara that the
21 Prime Minister's letter be considered during the weekend retreat.
22 3. For Suva only. MIFT (not to all) contains text of personal
23 message from Prime Minister to Ratu Mara. Please arrange for
24 its early delivery. You should explain that Ramphal is aware
25 of the message (though he has not seen the text), and would be
glad to advise Ratu Mara on how it might be handled. You should

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File number	Dept	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals)		LIMITED CCD, FID, UND, SAD, SPD, SEAD, PS, PS/MR ONSLOW, PS/PUS, SIR J LEAHY, MR SQUIRE
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Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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1 <<<<
 2 add that you yourself would be glad to explain further details
 3 of our Falklands policy to Ratu Mara if he would find this
 4 helpful. (Please let us know if you require further information
 5 yourself).
 6 4. For Canberra and Wellington only. Please explain to your
 7 host government, at whatever level you think best, what we are
 8 planning to do, adding that our action is in accordance with
 9 advice we have received from Ramphal. Please pass to them, in the
 10 strictest confidence, a copy of the Prime Minister's message
 11 to Ratu Mara and say that we would be most grateful if their
 12 delegation could take whatever steps at Suva are necessary
 13 to ensure that our views are clearly propounded and adequately
 14 defended there.
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 October, 1982.

The Falklands: Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting

Thank you for your letters of 4 and 8 October.

The Prime Minister agrees to send a message to the Prime Minister of Fiji. The text would be as in the first draft telegram annexed to your letter of 4 October, subject to the following amendments:

(a) Page 1, line 13

Delete "goodwill and".

(b) Page 1, line 25

Substitute "should" for "would".

(c) Page 2, line 14

After "invade" add a new sentence reading "Our losses were considerable, despite our success."

Then delete in lines 15-17 all from "and for the British people" to "of the Falkland Islands", so that the next sentence begins "They now have to live with "

(d) Page 3, line 10

Substitute "should" for "could".

(e) Add the wording in your letter of 8 October.

A. J. COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 October 1982

Dee John,

Possible Discussion of Falklands at Commonwealth Heads of
Government (Asia/Pacific) Regional Meeting: Suva, 14-18
October 1982

- mPM's Box
I wrote to you on 4 October to recommend that the Prime Minister send a message to the Prime Minister of Fiji. You may by now have seen UKMIS telno 1602 (copy enclosed) which recommends that we should send a message of gratitude to Fiji for her support for us in the non-aligned movement. This could be covered by the insertion, at the end of paragraph 1 of the draft telegram to Suva (enclosed with my letter of 4 October), of the following two sentences:

'I was particularly grateful to learn of the outstanding efforts which have been made by your delegation in New York. Their extensive lobbying and the encouraging response achieved as well as their declared intent to vote against the Latin-American resolution, epitomizes the robust support which Fiji and other Commonwealth countries have given us in the crisis and I am glad to be able to take this opportunity to thank you personally'.

The regional meeting begins in Suva on 14 October. I therefore hope that the Prime Minister's message to Ratu Mara can issue soon if she agrees.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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PP SUVA

RR VILA

CR 250

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 080022Z OCT 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1602 OF 7 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY SUVA ROUTINE VILA

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON

SUVA TELNO 206: FALKLANDS AT UNGA 37

1. I CALLED TODAY (7 OCTOBER) ON THE FIJIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND THANKED HIM FOR THE SUPPORT FIJI HAD GIVEN US IN THE COMMITTEE OF 24. THE MINISTER SAID THAT FIJI'S POSITION WAS THAT THEY WOULD VOTE AGAINST THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION (MY TELNO 1567 NOT TO ALL). THE VIEW OF THE INFORMAL SOUTH PACIFIC GROUP HERE, WHICH INCLUDED AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, WAS IN LINE WITH THE POSITION FIJI HAD TAKEN UP IN THE COMMITTEE OF 24, BUT WITH A QUESTION MARK OVER VANUATU. MOST DELEGATIONS WERE LIKELY TO SPEAK IN THE DEBATE ON THE FALKLANDS.
2. FIJI HAD ALSO BEEN DRUMMING UP SUPPORT AMONGST THE AFRICANS FOR OUR POSITION "BEGINNING WITH THE EASIEST" AND HAD HAD A FAVOURABLE RESPONSE FROM KENYA, MALAWI AND THE SUDAN.
3. FIJIAN EFFORTS ON OUR BEHALF ARE MOST ENCOURAGING ALTHOUGH THEY MAY BE OVER-ESTIMATING THE RESPONSE THEY HAVE HAD. THEIR UNEQUIVOCAL COMMITMENT TO VOTE AGAINST THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION IS THE FIRST OF ITS KIND AND AS SUCH IS IMPORTANT, WHETHER OR NOT IT SURVIVES IF THE DRAFT IS AMENDED. I RECOMMEND A MESSAGE OF GRATITUDE AT PRIME MINISTERIAL LEVEL. THIS COULD HELP MAINTAIN FIJIAN ROBUSTNESS.
4. IT MIGHT ALSO BE WORTH MAKING A DEMARCHE IN VILA. THE VANUATU REPRESENTATIVE HERE IS STILL THE UNRELIABLE VAN LIEROP (GOULDING'S LETTER NO25/1 OF 2 DECEMBER 1981 TO WILLIAMS, UND).

025/2



18 OCT 1982



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Reference.....

As per attached distribution list

AKK-7/10

h.a.

COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS' REACTIONS TO FALKLANDS CRISIS

1. Attached is a list of Commonwealth Governments' reactions to the Falklands crisis as at 1 October. Reactions from the Dependent Territories have also been noted.

1 October 1982

COMMONWEALTH COORDINATION DEPARTMENT

COUNTRIES' REACTIONS TO FALKLANDS CRISIS

- Antigua and Barbuda** Robust statement by PM copied to Commonwealth SG. Full support to UK initiative. Support in OAS/UN. Remain "strongly pro-British" after recapture of S. Georgia.
- Australia** Recalled Ambassador. He returned 28 April, delivering strongly worded message to Galtieri. Ban on imports; ban on credit. Robust statements/messages of support before and after recapture of S. Georgia. Statement at Security Council. PM wrote to President Reagan/lobbied with VP Bush. But quoted as saying that unlikely to be drawn into "hostilities": "outside our sphere of influence and our region". Private message of congratulations to PM and congratulatory public statement following Argentine surrender. Governmental contribution of A\$250,000 to national appeal to assist families of British servicemen and Falkland Islanders. Diplomatic effort in BA to ensure fast return of Argentine prisoners. Offer to reconsider purchase of Invincible. Spoke robustly in Committee of 24.
- Bahamas** Robust reply to PM's letter, to be referred to in Government statement. Note to Argentine Government urging compliance with SCR 502. Robust statement. PM and Foreign Minister refused to see Argentine lobbying delegation travelling in Caribbean: seen by senior official.
- Statement condemning "use of force in settling disputes". Robust statement privately to High Commissioner from Permanent Secretary Foreign Affairs. Helpful in NAM.
- Barbados** "Full and complete support to any Commonwealth protest and initiative". Prime Minister delivered statement during televised budget debate ensuring maximum coverage. Support in OAS. Although sympathetic to UK position, PM said Barbados would be unlikely to vote against Argentine resolution (28 September).
- Belgium** Reply to PM. Telegram to UNSG. Robust statement. Message to Caricom ministers urging support for SCR 502. Continued support after recapture of S. Georgia and further hostilities. Sustained pro-British attitudes throughout the hostilities, in the press, at home and abroad (eg meeting in Costa Rica in May). Further message to some Commonwealth colleagues urging them to rally Caricom and Commonwealth countries to support UK at UN. In. actions to support us in NAM and UN.
- /*Botswana

Country

- *Botswana Statement "strongly condemns" Argentine action. No specific mention of support for UK. Replied to SG's letter. "Likely" to continue support following recapture of S Georgia (BHC). *Helpful in NAM*
- *Canada Robust and helpful line and statements. Recalled Ambassador. Returned 21 April. Passing reports from BA and other information to UK. Banned military shipments. Cancelled Defence College visit. Ban on imports and export credit. Helpful statement on recapture of S. Georgia. Canadian House of Commons motion. Canadians will urge interlocutors to abstain as far as possible.
- Cyprus After long silence prior to recapture of South Georgia, initially declined to make "an independent statement" but undertook not to say anything "adverse". However statement published on 24 May referred to SCR 502 but condemned "the retention at the end of the 20th century of the last remnants of colonialism". We remonstrated, and the speech subsequently made by the Cyprus Foreign Minister in Havana was apparently in milder language although the message remained essentially the same. A further statement, issued on 21 June and quoting the Havana speech, confirmed that this remained the Cyprus Government's position. Instructions to abstain in General Committee vote (21 September).
- *+Dominica Robust letter to Prime Minister. Robust message to UNSG.
- *+Fiji Robust statement by PM. "Understanding and support" at official level after recapture of South Georgia. Helpful in Committee of 24. UK can count on "continued support at UNGA and in Committee of 24".
- The Gambia Robust Government statement. Helping with refuelling and overflights of Task Force planes. Mrs Thatcher sent personal message in April. Entered reservation on NAM communique.
- Ghana Response unlikely because of domestic crises. But Ghana "would not condemn Britain, nor support Argentina". Instructions to Missions on these lines. Entered reservation on NAM statement. After Argentine lobbying, MFA said "now was not the time to open a debate on sovereignty".

/Grenada

G. ada

Unhelpful statement supporting Argentine's territorial claim but disapproving of use of force.

*+Guyana

Strong statement by Guyana Government. Voted for SCR 502. Robust reply to Ramphal's letter. Robust reply PM letter. Assurance of support from PM in UN/NAM before and after recapture of S. Georgia. Entered reservation on NAM statement after some attempt at Havana to amend it. Keen to help us. Not optimistic that support in NAM would affect pro-Argentine tilt, but thought that likely to be more effective in UNGA.

India

Lukewarm; appealing to 'all parties' to seek a 'peaceful resolution'. PM privately does not approve either of Argentine or UK action over South Georgia. BHC thinks in public India 'will probably try to maintain some sort of balance', but that Indian sympathies 'essentially with us'. This could change if international opinion turned against UK. India would 'try (repeat try) to ensure a moderate consensus' in NAM, but would find it difficult not to support call for negotiations (15 September). PM 'made no particular response' to Mr Nott's personal appeal during his visit.

*+Jamaica

Robust statement. As deputy PM recently told Mr Onslow, maintained firm stance in OAS. Some attempt at Havana to change language of NAM statement subsequent reservation. Continued 'general sympathy and support'. Glad to see 'resumption of contact' with Argentina not ruled out'. 'Ready to speak right' in NAM and UNGA (17 September), provided not isolated.

*Kenya

Robust statements (one in UNGA). Entered reservation on NAM statement. Kenya would support in UN even if NAM position different; President also continuing chairman of OAU.

*Kiribati

Robust statement in message to Argentine Government condemning invasion (made public).

*+Lesotho

Response to SG expressing 'deep concern'. Helpful in NAM. PM 'saw no difficulty about support' over S. Georgia but would need to consult. Statement in National Assembly in support of S. Georgia. Entered reservation on NAM statement. Lesotho's support for Britain reiterated by Lesotho High Commissioner on 25 May. No reason why Lesotho's 'basically pro-UK attitude' should change. Agreed Argentine demand for negotiations leading to sovereignty inappropriate.

*+Malawi

President's robust reply to PM: moral backing for use of force if necessary. Robust statement. President assured that he 'fully supported British action in S. Atlantic' following recapture of S. Georgia and further hostilities. President's 'deep sorrow' at losses of HMS 'Sheffield' and Harriers. Personal message of congratulations from President following Argentine surrender. Senior Official at MFA 'took on board' UK points but no significant reaction. (17 September)

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Country

● Malaysia

Weak statement although "deeply disturbed". Little prospect of "official reaction" to recapture of S. Georgia; but UK points conveyed to PM. "No encouragement to think that Malaysia will be any more helpful in UNGA" (20 September).

Malta

Government remained aloof throughout and made no statement. Avoided participation in Council of Europe vote; but in conversation with BHC Foreign Minister said Malta "committed in support". During televised debate at beginning of May, however, he said that too much attention was being given to the issue. Expected to "remain unhelpful" at UNGA.

*+Mauritius

Robust reply to Ramphal quoting Security Council instructions. Robust statement. Congratulated on recapturing S. Georgia. PM "sympathetic" after further military action. Did not attend NAM and do not know if reservation entered. Will support UK over non-resumption of early negotiations.

Nauru

*New Zealand

Robust statements/messages of support. Broken diplomatic relations. Support at UN. Cancelled Argentine flight schedule. Ban on trade, supply of arms/military material, export credits. "Support of (NZ) Government" for action taken to recapture S. Georgia. Loan of frigate. Congratulatory private message to PM and positive public statement following Argentine surrender. New Zealand prepared to vote against UN Resolution on 22 September.

*+Nigeria

Message to PM, acknowledged by her. Helpful statement. Instructions to be helpful in NAM; Support for "genuine negotiations", self-determination, appreciation of UK mood. Official "foresaw instructions" sent accordingly to UN.

*Papua New Guinea

Robust statement by PM PNG. To make feelings known through international bodies. Responded to SG quoting statement. Told Argentine Government that unless complies with SCR 502 PNG will break off diplomatic relations. Assurance of continued support after recapture of S. Georgia. New Government confirmed would follow similar (sympathetic) line to predecessor. Agreed to be helpful in UNGA and "to give support to Argentine resolutions".

*+Saint Lucia

Strong statement. Helpful statement in OAS.

*+Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Robust statement. Copy sent to SG

/*Seychelles

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*Seychelles

Response to PM letter deploring aggression: made public. Unwilling to give indication of "likely Government reaction" after recapture of S. Georgia. Believe did not attend NAM. Do not know if entered reservation.

*+Sierra Leone

Statement views developments 'with great concern'. Mrs Thatcher sent personal message in April. Ambassador UN instructed to 'condemn Argentine action in strong terms'. SLG providing extensive facilities for bunkering and refuelling etc of Task Force. Support after recapture of S. Georgia. Helpful in NAM. Presidential message welcoming cessation of fighting, acknowledged by Mrs Thatcher. Very helpful statement in Committee of 24.

*+Singapore

Fairly robust statement although no specific mention of support for UK. Robust reply from PM to PM's message. Entered reservation in NAM statement.

*+Solomon Islands

Robust statement. Government has also sent message to SG of UN and to SG of Commonwealth. "Assurance" of support to Prime Minister. Robust reply to PM letter. "Wholly sympathetic" over action to recapture S. Georgia. Cabinet has endorsed continued support for UK position.

Sri Lanka

Message to Prime Minister "condemns use of force" but no specific support for UK. Helpful in NAM.

*+Swaziland

Statement expressing "great concern" at invasion and supporting SCR 502. Instructions on similar lines sent to New York. Following S. Georgia and other hostilities PM and FM gave assurances of continued support in UN and generally. Entered reservation on NAM statement.

Tanzania

Statement regrets Argentine military actions but no specific mention of support for UK. Letter to PM from President expressing "sympathy" over Falklands problem. "Wholly sympathetic" response from Foreign Minister after recapture of S. Georgia and "no tendency" at highest level to criticise even if force used to remove Argentines. NAM position not known. President privately expressed pleasure at Falklands outcome.

/*Tonga

Country

- Tonga
Robust reply to PM letter: would support "any action" by us to reassert sovereignty. Robust public statement. Argentine citizens banned from Tonga. "Sympathetic understanding" of UK position after recapture of S. Georgia.
- *+Trinidad and Tobago
"Feeble" public statement, but helpful in OAS. Twice abstained in votes to invoke Rio Treaty. Likely that Trinidad would maintain in OAS its support for SCR 502. No reaction to recapture of S. Georgia. PM's message thanking for help in OAS made public. Senior Minister privately expressed strong support for UK position. Entered reservation on NAM statement after some attempt at Havana to amend it.
- *+Tuvalu
Robust reply to SG and Secretary of State. Congratulatory message from PM following Argentine surrender.
- *Uganda
Voted for SCR 502. Helpful with Non-Aligned. Replied to PM letter: "great concern". Statement condemning aggression. Support after recapture of S. Georgia and continued support in UN. Supported UNSCR 505 but no reservation on NAM. Appeal for support at UN to be given "sympathetic consideration".
- *Vanuatu
Statement "strongly condemns" invasion, but also calls upon UK to "reconsider" military retaliation. Copied to SG, PM, Argentine Government, UN. PM "most receptive" and "entirely satisfied" over recapture of S. Georgia.
- Western Samoa
- *Zambia
Statement by Acting President deploring invasion. Support in NAM. Continued support after recapture of S. Georgia. Foreign Minister expressed "very deep sorrow" at loss of life in HMS Sheffield. High Commission told Mr Onslow on 25 May that no change in Zambia's attitude to British stance on Falklands. Entered reservation on NAM statement.
- Zimbabwe
Inadequate statement but urging UK and Argentine to abide by SCR 502. No reaction to recapture of South Georgia further hostilities.

/DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

Anguilla	Message of support.
Ascension	Message of support.
*Bermuda	Public statement: Premier "deplores" invasion; supports self-determination. Offered facilities. Ministers urged trade ban. Fund opened for donations to Atlantic Fund.
British Virgin Islands	Import ban. Message of solidarity and support.
Cayman Islands	Public subscription to be sent to UK with "appropriate message from government and people". Trade ban. Contribution of \$ $\frac{1}{2}$ million to Atlantic Fund.
Gibraltar	Robust resolution in House of Assembly in support of UK following recapture of S. Georgia. Congratulatory message following Argentine surrender.
Hong Kong	Imports ban. Imposed visa requirement on Argentines. Argentine Consulate-General closed.
Montserrat	"Public consider Britain is right". "Pleased with S. Georgia news". Congratulatory message following Argentine surrender.
Tristan da Cunha	"Sympathy for Falkland Islanders" and "total support for measures ... to recover island". Message of support.
Turks and Caicos Islands	Statement by Chief Minister: "We are behind Mrs Thatcher".
St Helena	"Fully supports UK action".

Notes:

- * Countries which have explicitly (or implicitly through support for SCR 502) in public or in private condemned Argentina's invasion and/or called for withdrawal of Argentine forces.
- + Countries which have expressed support for the principles of self-determination in relation to the Falklands.

Distribution

Private Secretary

Mr Warren-Gash

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TO PRIORITY SUVA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 202 OF 11 OCTOBER.

AND TO PRIORITY CANBERRA, WELLINGTON

INFO ROUTINE NEW DELHI, PORT MORESBY, DHAKA, KUALA LUMPUR,
SINGAPORE

INFO SAVING NUKU'ALOFA, COLOMBO, UKMIS NEW YORK

POSSIBLE DISCUSSION OF FALKLANDS DURING CHOGRM

1. WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR RESPONSES TO FCO TELNO 131 TO SUVA.
2. IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THESE COMMENTS, AND OF FURTHER ADVICE FROM RAMPHAL, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS DECIDED TO SEND A MESSAGE TO RATU MARA SETTING OUT OUR POLICY AND ENCOURAGING HIM TO PASS A COPY TO OTHERS PRESENT AT THE MEETING SO THAT THEY ARE AWARE OF OUR VIEWS. RAMPHAL HAS UNDERTAKEN TO SUGGEST TO RATU MARA THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER BE CONSIDERED DURING THE WEEKEND RETREAT.
3. FOR SUVA ONLY. MIFT (NOT TO ALL) CONTAINS TEXT OF PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO RATU MARA. PLEASE ARRANGE FOR ITS EARLY DELIVERY. YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT RAMPHAL IS AWARE OF THE MESSAGE (THOUGH HE HAS NOT SEEN THE TEXT), AND WOULD BE GLAD TO ADVISE RATU MARA ON HOW IT MIGHT BE HANDLED. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT YOU YOURSELF WOULD BE GLAD TO EXPLAIN FURTHER DETAILS OF OUR FALKLANDS POLICY TO RATU MARA IF HE WOULD FIND THIS HELPFUL. (PLEASE LET US KNOW IF YOU REQUIRE FURTHER INFORMATION YOURSELF).
4. FOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON ONLY. PLEASE EXPLAIN TO YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT, AT WHATEVER LEVEL YOU THINK BEST, WHAT WE ARE PLANNING TO DO, ADDING THAT OUR ACTION IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ADVICE WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM RAMPHAL. PLEASE PASS TO THEM, IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, A COPY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO RATU MARA AND SAY THAT WE WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL IF THEIR DELEGATION COULD TAKE WHATEVER STEPS AT SUVA ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT OUR VIEWS ARE CLEARLY PROPOUNDED AND ADEQUATELY DEFENDED THERE.

PYM

LIMITED	SEAD
CCD	PS
FID	PS/MR ONSLOW
UND	PS/PUS
SAD	SIR J LEAHY
SPD	MR SQUIRE

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Argentina

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TO PRIORITY SUVA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 203 OF 11 OCTOBER

INFO CANBERRA, WELLINGTON

MIPT: FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO RATU MARA

BEGINS:

1. AS I AM SURE YOU KNOW, THE STAUNCH SUPPORT WHICH YOU AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH LEADERS HAVE GIVEN US SINCE THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS HAVE BEEN A SOURCE OF INSPIRATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO ME AND TO MY COLLEAGUES, AND HAVE REMINDED US ALL OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES WHICH COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS HOLD IN COMMON. I WAS PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL TO LEARN OF THE OUTSTANDING EFFORTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE BY YOUR DELEGATION IN NEW YORK. THEIR EXTENSIVE LOBBYING AND THE ENCOURAGING RESPONSE ACHIEVED AS WELL AS THEIR DECLARED INTENT TO VOTE AGAINST THE LATIN-AMERICAN RESOLUTION, EPITOMISE THE ROBUST SUPPORT WHICH FIJI AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES HAVE GIVEN US IN THE CRISIS AND I AM GLAD TO BE ABLE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THANK YOU PERSONALLY.
2. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO BE VERY GRATEFUL FOR ANY SUPPORT THAT YOU AND YOUR COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES CAN GIVE US IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD PARTICULARLY LIKE TO EXPLAIN OUR THINKING TO YOU BEFORE YOU COME TO CHAIR THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION. BRITAIN IS NOT, OF COURSE, REPRESENTED AT THESE MEETINGS, BUT IF THE MATTER ARISES, I SHOULD LIKE OUR VIEWS, AND THE STRENGTH WITH WHICH WE HOLD THEM, TO BE FULLY UNDERSTOOD. I SHOULD IN ANY CASE BE HAPPY FOR YOU TO PASS COPIES OF THIS MESSAGE TO THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IF YOU SEE FIT, SO THAT THEY HAVE ACCESS TO AN EXPLANATION OF OUR POSITION AT THE MEETING AND WHEN, LATER, THEY ARE CONSIDERING THEIR OWN POSITION AT THE UNITED NATIONS.
3. YOU PROBABLY ALREADY KNOW THAT ARGENTINA IS CURRENTLY SEEKING SUPPORT FOR A DRAFT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION CALLING ON US TO

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ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH HER ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS. AS I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND, THE UK WILL OPPOSE ANY OTHER RESOLUTION. WE CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO RESUME - AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED - THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARGENTINA HERSELF BROKE OFF WITH NO WARNING EARLIER THIS YEAR IN ORDER TO INVADE. OUR LOSSES WERE CONSIDERABLE DESPITE OUR SUCCESSES. THE INVASION WAS A TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE FOR THE ISLANDERS. THEY NOW HAVE TO LIVE WITH THE TERRIBLE AFTERMATH OF WAR, INCLUDING UNEXPLODED MINES, SCATTERED INDISCRIMINATELY THROUGHOUT THE ISLANDS. THE DAMAGE WILL TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME, EFFORT AND MONEY TO REPAIR. TIME WILL ALSO BE NEEDED TO ENABLE THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS TO RECOVER AND THINK ABOUT THEIR FUTURE BEFORE EXPRESSING THEIR VIEWS. WHAT IS MORE, DESPITE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S VARIOUS ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT HOSTILITIES HAVE CEASED DE FACTO, THEY HAVE STILL FAILED TO ISSUE AN UNAMBIGUOUS DECLARATION THAT HOSTILITIES WILL NOT BE RESUMED. OUR EFFORTS TO END THE CONFLICT AND START THE PROCESS OF GETTING RELATIONS BACK TO NORMAL HAVE MET WITH LITTLE OR NO UNDERSTANDING OR COOPERATION. ARGENTINA APPEARS TO SEE NEGOTIATION SOLELY AS A ROUTE TOWARDS THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY.

4. IF THERE IS ANY DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT AT YOUR MEETING IN SUVA, I SHOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL IF YOU AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES WOULD UNDERLINE THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER WHICH ARGENTINA CALLED INTO QUESTION BY HER INVASION, PRINCIPLES WHICH HAVE ALWAYS RECEIVED THE COMMONWEALTH'S FIRM SUPPORT. I HOPE IN PARTICULAR THAT YOU WILL ALL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION TO BE GIVEN FULL WEIGHT IN THE CASE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS, WHO ARE AS FULLY ENTITLED TO IT AS ALL OTHER PEOPLES AND WHOSE RIGHTS IN THIS, AS IN MANY OTHER RESPECTS, ARGENTINA SEEKS TO DENY. I WOULD ALSO ASK THAT YOU AND THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO BE REPRESENTED AT THE MEETING SHOULD REFRAIN - AS MANY OF THEM DID IN 1976 - FROM SUPPORTING ANY RESOLUTION AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHICH CALLS ON US TO NEGOTIATE. ALTHOUGH THE TIMING IS NOT YET CLEAR, I UNDERSTAND THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAY BE DISCUSSING THE FALKLANDS SOME TIME IN MID-NOVEMBER.

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