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OO UKMIS NEW YORK

PP WASHINGTON

GRS 550

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FM FCO 151300Z NOV 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1000 OF 15 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 1836: FALKLANDS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

1. WE AGREE GENERALLY WITH THE LINE YOU PROPOSE TO TAKE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.
2. WE SHOULD HOWEVER PREFER YOU NOT (NOT) TO USE THE PHRASE 'NEGOTIATIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY' EITHER WITH REFERENCE TO THE PAST OR TO THE FUTURE. THE 1977 TERMS OF REFERENCE DID SPECIFICALLY MENTION THAT A SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE EXISTED, BUT ALL TALKS WERE HELD ON THE STRICT UNDERSTANDING THAT NEITHER SIDE'S POSITION ON SOVEREIGNTY WOULD BE PREDUDICED. WE WOULD NOT WISH TO SAY NOW THAT, IF THERE WERE A CHANGE OF HEART IN ARGENTINA, SOVEREIGNTY COULD AGAIN BE ON THE AGENDA. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN YOUR STATEMENT TO THE ASSEMBLY, IE THAT IF THERE WERE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE OF HEART BY ARGENTINA THEN THERE WOULD BE HOPE THAT THE DISPUTE COULD BE PUT BEHIND US.
3. YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO MAKE THE ARTICLE 73 POINT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BUT WE SHOULD PREFER YOU WHEN SPEAKING TO THE PRESS TO REST SIMPLY ON THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND BY ME REJECTING THE RESOLUTION.
4. WE DO NOT ACCEPT THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONTINUES TO HAVE A MANDATE UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 505. THAT RESOLUTION WAS ADDRESSED TO A SITUATION WHICH NO LONGER EXISTS AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MANDATE HAS IN OUR VIEW ACCORDINGLY LAPSED.
5. IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE HOW MUCH CAPITAL THE ARGENTINES ARE ABLE TO MAKE OUT OF THE PASSAGE OF THEIR MUCH DILUTED RESOLUTION WITH ITS RATHER POOR LEVEL OF SUPPORT. IN GENERAL WE SEE ADVANTAGE IN YOUR REPLYING IN BRIEF BUT FIRM TERMS TO ANY ARGENTINE ATTACKS, IN THE HOPE THAT THE TEDIUM THEY MAY ENGENDER

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WILL INCREASE SYMPATHY FOR OUR POSITION.

ARGENTINE INTENTIONS

6. THERE ARE OF COURSE MANY OPTIONS OPEN TO THE ARGENTINES. WE DO NOT THINK THEY WILL SEE IT AS IN THEIR INTERESTS TO ANNOUNCE A DEFINITIVE END TO HOSTILITIES AND/OR A RENUNCIATION OF THE FUTURE USE OF FORCE, UNLESS THIS WERE FIRMLY TIED TO A BRITISH CONCESSION, PROBABLY ON NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT WE NECESSARILY THINK THERE WILL BE FURTHER HOSTILITIES: SIMPLY THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL PREFER TO KEEP THEIR OPTIONS OPEN AND US GUESSING.

7. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD HOPE FOR A MUTUAL RELAXATION OF COMMERCIAL SANCTIONS (AND ARE INDEED WORKING ON THIS), A RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND/OR SERVICES FOR THE ISLANDS MUST BE A MUCH DIMMER PROSPECT AND ONLY CONCEIVABLE IF WE AGREE TO SOME SORT OF NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE ISLANDS' FUTURE.

8. IF, UNEXPECTEDLY, THE ARGENTINES DID TAKE ANY OF THE STEPS OUTLINED IN YOUR PARA 8, WE SHOULD HAVE TO EXAMINE CAREFULLY EXACTLY WHAT WAS ON OFFER, BUT IN PRINCIPLE WE WOULD WELCOME THEM. THERE ARE SOME STRAWS IN THE WIND, EG AN OFFER, OF SORTS, ON MINE CLEARANCE. WHETHER THESE WILL AMOUNT TO A BASIS ON WHICH WE MIGHT NUDGE THE ARGENTINES TOWARDS ANNOUNCING A DEFINITIVE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES REMAINS TO BE SEEN. ANY COOPERATION ON REPATRIATION OF THEIR DEAD WOULD CERTAINLY BE WELCOME. A DEFINITIVE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (OR EVEN A VISIBLE LOWERING OF THE TEMPERATURE FALLING SHORT OF THAT), PROVIDED IT WERE NOT DEPENDENT ON AGREEMENT ON OUR PART TO NEGOTIATIONS, COULD HELP WITH VITALLY IMPORTANT LINKS WITH BRAZIL, CHILE AND URUGUAY.

PYM

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